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MULTIVIDEO LAB v. INTEL CORPORATION
Karen A. Gibbs'
I. BACKGROUND
Multivideo Labs, Inc. ("MVL") asserted the following causes of
action against Intel Corporation ("Intel")': (1) actual and attempted
monopolization in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act; (2) false
advertising in violation of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act; and (3)
tortious interference with prospective business advantage.2  Intel
moved for summary judgment on MVL's claims. 3
Central to the dispute was Intel's involvement in the Ease-of-Use
Initiative ("the Initiative"), which Intel and other computer industry
participants hope will increase consumer demand for personal
computers ("PCs") by making PCs easier for consumers to use. One
of the biggest challenges that the Initiative has taken on is the lack of
a standard for peripheral connections to PCs. Because there was no
standardized connection, if a consumer wanted to connect a new
peripheral to his or her PC, he or she often would have to go through
several steps to connect the peripheral, including shutting down the
PC, opening up the PC, and adding an insert or a card that would
enable the peripheral to connect and work.
To alleviate the peripheral connection problem, the Initiative
seeks to establish the reality of "Plug and Play," meaning that a
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1. Multivideo Labs, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 2000 WL 12122 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7,2000).
2. See id.at*12.
3. Seeid. at*l.
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customer can simply buy a peripheral device, plug it in, and go to
work. To this end, Intel, Compaq, Digital Equipment, NEC,
Microsoft, IBM, and Northern Telecom developed a standard and
corresponding Universal Serial Bus4 ("USB") specification ("the
Specification") to enable easy attachment of peripherals. The USB
technology not only provides a standard for ports and protocols but
also provides the means to manage power consumption for a system
of computer components. To manage power consumption, the
Specification provides a way for the host computer to identify
attached peripherals and then, based on a specified power budget for
each USB peripheral, to manage power running through the bus in a
way that supports as many peripherals as possible. To avoid a system
crash, each USB peripheral must be designed and manufactured in
conformance with its specified power budget. If a device exceeds its
power budget, the manufacturer is required to reengineer the device to
fit within its power budget.
To further assist its Plug and Play efforts, the Initiative also
promotes the use of USB-compliant extension cables. USB-
compliant cables have an upstream USB "A" plug at one end and a
downstream USB "B" plug at the other. Series "A" plugs are always
oriented upstream, that is towards the PC, and can connect only with
"A" sockets, and series "B" plugs are always oriented downstream
and can connect only with "B" sockets. Because of this
configuration, compliant cables cannot be connected together, or
"cascaded." Non-compliant cables use an "A' socket at one end and
an "'A" plug at the other. Non-compliant cables therefore can be
linked together without limit and result in cable lengths exceeding the
Specification's five-meter limit-often resulting in a system crash.
Even though Intel's competitive role in the USB market is
minimal and intentionally diminishing, Intel has contributed
substantial resources to the development and promotion of the USB
standard and Plug and Play effort, including creating a group within
Intel whose sole responsibility is to support USB. And Intel and the
other drafters of the Specification formed the Universal Serial Bus
Implementation Forum ("USB-IF"), an unincorporated, voluntary
membership organization engaged in all aspects of PC development.
USB-IF has over 500 member companies, including MVL. Intel is
the designated administrator and Chair of the UBS-IF, and regularly
4. The "bus" refers to the lines through which computer components, including the host
computer and computer peripherals, communicate. See id. at *2.
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answers questions about the interpretation of the Specification
without consulting other members.
To further the adoption of the USB Specification, several times
each year, the USB-IF sponsors "Plugfests," where the USB-IF tests
products for compliance with the USB Specification. If a product
passes the test, the USB-IF includes it on an "Integrators' List,"
which is given to developers and members of the USB-IF. Products
on the list are allowed to display USB logos.
So why did MVL sue Intel? MVL's main USB product is the
Active Extension Cable ("AEC"), which MVL invented to help PC
users connect USB peripherals to PCs or to each other from a distance
up to eighty feet. To keep power levels sufficiently high in order to
avoid a crash, the AEC used a "repeater" to amplify and sustain
electrical signals. Upon completion of the AEC, MVL announced
that the AEC was 100% compatible with the Specification and
brought it to the April 1998 Plugfest for testing. After testing,
however, the USB-IF found that the AEC was not 100% compatible.
One of the main problems was that MVL designed the AEC so that a
customer could link several AECs together to create a longer cord.
With each AEC extension, the level of effectiveness fell. If a
customer linked five AECs together, for example, the level of
effectiveness fell to 66%.
Despite the AEC's failure to obtain a place on the "Integrators'
List," MVL proceeded to manufacture the AEC. And when MVL
first launched its AEC product in January 1999, the AEC's packaging
prominently displayed the letters "USB." The front of the package
even stated that the AEC was "100% Compatible w/ the USB
Electrical & Timing Specs for USB hub... Connect up to 5 cables in
a series."'5 Even the plug itself contained a USB icon.
In response, an Intel employee sent a letter to MVL and other
companies believed to be manufacturing AECs stating that the AEC is
not USB compliant. The letter also stated that the AEC had no
Specification-required hub, which allows a computer to recognize the
device when plugged in. The letter asked that MVL cease
representing that the AEC was USB compliant unless it was a hub by
itself and had passed USB-IF testing. As a result of receiving this
letter, one AEC manufacturer ceased negotiating a deal for the
purchase of chips that would have enabled the manufacturer to
produce AECs, and orders from several customers were "relegated to
20001
5. Id.at*ll.
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the back burner."6 In other words, there was a "general cooling of the
market" for the AEC.7
II. HOLDING, RATIONALE AND DISCUSSION
A. Sherman Act Claims
MVL alleged both actual and attempted monopolization, but
focused on monopoly leveraging-in other words, that Intel used its
"monopoly power in one market to gain a competitive advantage in
another, albeit without an attempt to monopolize the second market."8
The court found no genuine issue of material fact for trial because
MVL failed to provide evidence that Intel's products compete with
the AEC in the relevant market, that Intel's statements were anything
but truthful, and that Intel's motives or actions were anti-competitive. 9
The threshold requirement for establishing a Section 2 claim is
whether the defendant has sufficient market power in the relevant
market. In antitrust law, the relevant market is the "area of effective
competition."' 0 Here, MVL defined the relevant market as that for
USB interconnect devices. The court, however, found that there was
no evidence establishing that MVL and Intel were competitors in the
USB interconnect devices market, or that Intel had the requisite
market power in the USB market." In fact, the court found that Intel
offered credible evidence to the contrary, establishing that Intel offers
very few USB products or components, and that it does not
manufacture any USB hubs, cables, or other interconnect products.12
MVL's argument that Intel's Ethernet products "may" be an
alternative to USB products and therefore may compete with MVL's
products also fell flat.
MVL also tried to argue that Intel leveraged its monopoly in the
6. Id. at* 12.
7. Multivideo, 2000 WL 12122 at *12.
8. Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides that "[elvery person who shall monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States ... shall be deemed guilty of a felony."
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). Plaintiffs can bring a variety of claims under Section 2, including claims
of illegal monopoly maintenance, monopolization, attempt to monopolize, and in some forums,
monopoly leveraging.
9. See Multivideo, 2000 WL 12122 at *15.
10. AD/SAT, Inc. v. Associated Press, 181 F.3d 216,227 (2d Cir. 1999).
11. See Multivideo, 2000 WL 12122 at *13.
12. See id.
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worldwide market for microprocessors.' 3 MVL stated that Intel had
substantial market power in the market for central processing units
("CPUs") and that Intel exercised that power through the USB-IF to
prevent MVL from competing in the market for the USB interconnect
products. But the court rejected this argument, too, because MVL's
AEC does not compete with products in the microprocessor market.
The court cited the Second Circuit's ruling in Berkey Photo, Inc. v.
Eastman Kodak Co.,' 4 which held that a commercial actor can violate
Section 2 of the Sherman Act "by using its monopoly power to gain a
competitive advantage in another market, albeit without any attempt
to monopolize the second market."' 5  The court then, referring to
Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan,6 noted that the idea of monopoly
leveraging claims under Section 2 has been questioned by the
Supreme Court. The court noted that even if leveraging survived
Spectrum Sports, the doctrine most likely would be limited to activity
that injures competition, not competitors. 17 The court then found no
evidence that Intel had used its power in the microprocessor market to
exclude competition in the AEC market. Instead, just the opposite,
the court found that Intel was enthusiastic to hear about a possible
USB-compliant cable and that it encouraged MVL to develop a
compliant product. 9
MVL also contended that Intel employees' statements that the
AEC was non-compliant were anti-competitive. 20 To establish that a
defendant has engaged in false and misleading advertising, a plaintiff
"[m]ust overcome a presumption that the effect on competition of
such a practice was de minimis."2' To overcome the de minimus
presumption, a plaintiff must show that the representations were: (1)
clearly false; (2) clearly material; (3) clearly likely to induce
reasonable reliance; (4) made to buyers without knowledge of the
subject matter; (5) continued for prolonged periods; and (6) not
13. See id.
14. 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979).
15 Id. at275.
16. 506 U.S. 447 (1993).
17. See Multivideo, 2000 WL 12122 at *14.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id. at *15.
21. National Ass'n of Phann. Mfrs., Inc. v. Ayerst Labs., 850 F.2d 904, 916 (2d Cir.
1988).
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readily susceptible of neutralization or other offset by rivals 2
Because MVL admitted that Intel's statements were true, MVL failed
to clear even the first hurdle of this standard.23
B. Lanham Act Claim
MVL contended that Intel violated Section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act by sending a letter to MVL manufacturers and distributors. 24 To
establish a Section 43(a) violation, a plaintiff must prove: (1) the
statements were false or misleading; and (2) the statements were
made in commercial advertising or promotion.25 The court found that
MVL failed to satisfy these two elements of a Lanham Act claim, and
granted Intel's motion for summary judgment.
The court found that MVL did not satisfy the requirement that
the statements be false or misleading. The court found that the
plaintiff "must demonstrate, by extrinsic evidence, that the challenged
[statements] tend to mislead or confuse consumers."2 6 MVL did not
contend that the Intel letter was intentionally deceptive, but only that
it was confusing and misleading. MVL claimed that recipients of the
letter believed that the AEC did not work. The court, however, found
that since there was no evidence that the consumers held this belief, it
was not actionable. 27 Additionally, the court found that the AEC
failed to meet the Specification's requirements because it lacked the
controller to communicate with the computer and connecting five
AECs in series as stated on the box resulted in failure.23
The court also found that the statements at issue were not in
commercial advertising or promotion. "In order for representations to
constitute 'commercial advertising or promotion' under [the Lanham
Act], they must be: (1) commercial speech; (2) by a defendant who is
in commercial competition with plaintiff; (3) for the purpose of
influencing consumers to buy defendant's goods or services....
[and;] (4)... disseminated sufficiently to the relevant purchasing
public to constitute 'advertising' or 'promotion' within that
22. See id. at 916 (internal quotation omitted).
23. See Multivideo, 2000 WL 12122 at *15.
24. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994).
25. See id.
26. Johnson & Johnson * Merck Consumer Pharm. Co. v. Smithkline Beecham, 960 F.2d
294,297 (2d Cir. 1992).
27. See Multivideo, 2000 WL 12122 at *17.
28. See id.
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industry."29 MVL provided no evidence to show that the purpose of
the letter was to influence the purchase of Intel products. In fact, both
parties presented evidence that the motive behind the statements was
to promote compliance with an industry standard, which Intel and its
employees believed would benefit customers and competition within
the personal computing industry. 0
C. Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage
Claim
MVL also alleged that Intel's statements to AEC manufacturers
and distributors constituted tortious interference with MVL's business
relations. 3' To establish a tortious interference claim, a plaintiff must
prove: (1) a business relationship between the plaintiff and a third
party; (2) the defendant, knowing of that relationship, intentionally
interfered with it; (3) the defendant acted with the sole purpose of
harming the plaintiff, or used dishonest, unfair, or improper means;
and (4) the relationship was injured.32
The court granted Intel's summary judgment motion and
dismissed MVL's tortious interference claims. The court found that
MVL had offered no evidence to support the third element of its claim
by failing to establish, or even contend, that Intel had used "dishonest,
unfair or improper means. '33 The court also found that MVL failed to
establish that Intel had acted with the sole purpose of harming MVL.34
29. Gordon & Breach Science Publishers v. American Inst. Of Physics, 859 F. Supp.
1521, 1535-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
30. See Multivideo, 2000 WL 12122 at *17.
31. See id. at *18.
32. See id. (citing Goldhirsh Group Inc. v. Alpert, 107 F.3d 105, 108-09 (2d Cir. 1997)).
33. Id.
34. See id.
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